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ABSTRACT
The security of digital images attracts much attention recently, and
many different image encryption methods have been proposed. In
1999, J.-C. Yen and J.-I. Guo proposed a novel image encryp-
tion algorithm called BRIE (Bit Recirculation Image Encryption).
This paper points out that BRIE is not secure enough from strict
cryptographic viewpoint. It has been found that some defects ex-
ist in BRIE, and a known/chosen-plaintext attack can break BRIE
with only one known/chosen plain-image. Experiments are made
to verify the defects of BRIE and the feasibility of the attack.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the digital world nowadays, the security of digital images be-
comes more and more important since the communications of dig-
ital products over open network occur more and more frequently.
Furthermore, special and reliable security in storage and trans-
mission of digital images is needed in many applications, such
as pay-TV, medical imaging systems, military image communi-
cations and confidential video conferencing, etc. In order to ful-
fill such a task, many image encryption methods have been pro-
posed [1–7], but some of them [2, 6, 7] have been known to be
insecure [3, 8, 9].
In [1], a novel image encryption method called BRIE (Bit Re-
circulation Image Encryption) is proposed, which is a pixel trans-
formation cipher. This paper points out some security defects in
BRIE, and presents a known/chose-plaintext attack to break BRIE
with only one known/chosen plain-image. Generally speaking,
BRIE is not secure from strongly cryptographic viewpoint and
should not be used in any strict applications.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we firstly give
a brief introduction of BRIE. The detailed analyses about the se-
curity defects of BRIE are made in Sect. 3. The know/chosen-
plaintext attack is proposed in Sect. 4. Experimental results are
also included in Sect. 3 and 4. Section 5 briefly discusses how to
improve BRIE, and the last section concludes this paper.
2. BRIE ALGORITHM
The basic idea of BRIE is the bit recirculation of the pixels, which
is controlled by a chaotic pseudo-random binary sequence. The
secret keys of BRIE are two integers α, β and the initial condi-
tion x(0) of a one-dimensional chaotic system. Assume the size
of the plain-image is M × N . Run the chaotic system to make
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a chaotic orbit {x(i)}d(MN+1)/8e−1i=0 . Then generate a pseudo-
random binary sequence (PRBS) {b(i)}MNi=0 from the 8-bit binary
representation of x(i) = 0.b(8i + 0)b(8i + 1) · · · b(8i + 7). For
the plain-pixel f(x, y)(0 ≤ x ≤ M − 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ N − 1), the
cipher-pixel f ′(x, y) is determined by the following equation:
f ′(x, y) = ROLRqp(f(x, y)), (1)
where p = b(N × x + y), q = α + β × b(N × x + y + 1) and
ROLRqp is a cyclical shift by q bits in a direction controlled by p:
ROLRqp(x = b7b6 · · · b0) =
8><>:
7P
i=0
bi · 2(i−q+8) mod 8, p = 0
7P
i=0
bi · 2(i+q) mod 8 , p = 1
.
(2)
The decryption procedure can be denoted by
f(x, y) = ROLRq1−p(f
′(x, y)) = ROLR8−qp (f
′(x, y)). (3)
Apparently, BRIE is a pixel transformation cipher, i.e., the cipher-
pixel at (x, y) is uniquely determined by the plain-pixel at the
same position. The authors of [1] claim that BRIE needs very
low computation complexity, and has high security since {b(i)}
containsMN + 1 secure bits generated by the chaotic iterations.
However, we will point out that some serious defects exist in
BRIE, and that a known/chosen-plaintext attack can break it. The
BRIE encrypts the plain-image column by column, which is some-
what inconvenient in practice. In this paper, we modify BRIE to
work in line mode, which will not essentially influence the secu-
rity of BRIE.
3. SOME DEFECTS OF BRIE
3.1. Essential Defects ofROLR Operations
The ROLR operations controlled by pseudo-random chaotic se-
quence {b(i)} are the kernel of BRIE. ButROLR have two essen-
tial defects when it is used in BRIE, which both lower the security
of BRIE and limit its applications in practice.
1) Some plain-pixels may keep unchanged (f ′(x, y) = f(x, y))
after encryption. If there are too many such pixels, the plain-
image will roughly emerge from the cipher-image. The plain-
pixels can be divided into the following four classes1. C1) 0,
255: f ′(x, y) ≡ f(x, y), ∀α, β. C2) 85, 170: If α mod 2 = 0,
f ′(x, y) = f(x, y) when q = α; if α+β mod 2 = 0, f ′(x, y) =
f(x, y) when q = α+β; and if α mod 2 = (α+β) mod 2 = 0,
1Different repeated patterns exist in the binary representation of dif-
ferent pixels: C1) eight repeated bits – 0 (00000000), 1 (11111111); C2)
four repeated 2-bit segments – 85 (01010101), 170 (10101010); C3) two
repeated 4-bit segments – 17 (00010001), etc.; C4 – no repeated pattern.
f ′(x, y) ≡ f(x, y). C3) 17, 34, 51, 68, 102, 119, 136, 153, 187,
204, 221, 238: If α mod 4 = 0, f ′(x, y) = f(x, y) when q = α;
if α + β mod 4 = 0, f ′(x, y) = f(x, y) when q = α + β; and
if α mod 4 = (α + β) mod 4 = 0, f ′(x, y) ≡ f(x, y). C4)
All other gray values: If α mod 8 = 0, f ′(x, y) = f(x, y) when
q = α; if α+β mod 8 = 0, f ′(x, y) = f(x, y)when q = α+β;
and if α mod 8 = (α+ β) mod 8 = 0, f ′(x, y) ≡ f(x, y).
2) For a sub-region in the plain-image with fixed gray value,
at most eight2 gray values will be contained in the corresponding
sub-region of the cipher-image. Such a fact will make the edge of
this sub-region appear in the cipher-image.
a) Test Pattern.bmp b) Encrypted Test Pattern.bmp
Fig. 1. A special image encrypted with BRIE
a) Lenna.bmp b) Encrypted Lenna.bmp
c) Miss.bmp d) Encrypted Miss.bmp
Fig. 2. Lenna.bmp andMiss.bmp encrypted by BRIE, α = 5, β =
1, x(0) = 0.75
Apparently, if the cipher-image have many unchanged pix-
els and/or the plain-image have many sub-regions with fixed gray
values, it will be possible to obtain some useful information about
the plain-image by only observing the cipher-image. In Fig. 1,
we give the experimental result about a specially designed image,
2The number is determined by the fixed gray value: C1 – 1, C2 – 1 or
2, C3 – 1 ∼ 4, C4 – 1 ∼ 8.
which contains pixels in all four classes (The gray values of the
16 squares are respectively 0, 17, 34, ..., 221, 238, 255). The re-
lated parameters are α = 2, β = 4, x(0) = 0.75 and the chaotic
system is selected as logistic map with control parameter 3.9.
In fact, the second fact can be extended to more general case.
For a given sub-region, if all gray values are close and only a few
LSBs of the values are different, there will be enough similar pix-
els in the sub-cipher-region to cause the edge to emerge in the
cipher-image. Generally speaking, the larger the sub-region is
and the closer the gray values are, the more clear the edge will
be. In Fig. 2, Lenna.bmp and Miss.bmp are shown as examples.
In the cipher-images, we can find many important edges of the
plain-images.
3.2. Security Problem about α, β
The selection of α, β is not mentioned in [1]. We find α, β must
yield the following three restrictions to avoid possible insecurity,
the number of such values is only 7 × 7 − 7 − 2 = 40, which is
dramatically small and will be useful for cryptanalysis.
R1) 1 ≤ α ≤ 7, 1 ≤ β ≤ 7 . Consider ROLRqp =
ROLRq+8p , this restriction is natural.
R2) α+β 6= 8 . If α+β = 8, beyond half pixels will obey
f ′(x, y) = f(x, y) (recall the discussion in the last subsection).
Such a fact will cause the plain-image is roughly leaked from the
cipher-image. In Fig. 3, we give the results about Lenna.bmp and
Miss.bmp when α = 6, β = 2, x(0) = 0.75.
a) Encrypted Lenna.bmp b) Encrypted Miss.bmp
Fig. 3. Lenna.bmp andMiss.bmp encrypted by BRIE, α = 6, β =
2, x(0) = 0.75 (compare them with Fig. 2)
R3) α mod 8 6= 1, 7 or (α+ β) mod 8 6= 1, 7 . If the
restriction is not satisfied (when α = 1, β = 6 or α = 7, β = 2),
all plain-pixels will be encrypted by one-bit ROLR operation
since ROLR7p = ROLR11−p and ROLR9p = ROLR1p. Con-
sequently, rather larger visual information of the plain-image will
leak from the cipher-image. When α = 1, β = 6, x(0) = 0.75,
the results about Lenna.bmp and Miss.bmp are given in Fig. 4.
We can see the cipher-images contain so many strong edges that
one eavesdropper can guess the plain-image.
3.3. Low Practical Security to Brute-Force Attack
In [1], the authors claimed that there are 2MN+1 possible encryp-
tion results since the cipher-image is determined by {b(i)}MNi=0 .
Because all {b(i)} keep secret to illegal users and the reconstruc-
tion of the chaotic orbit {x(i)}d(MN+1)/8e−1i=0 is rather difficult,
BRIE is secure enough. However, the above statement is not true
because of the following fact: total MN + 1 bits are uniquely
determined by the chaotic system and its initial condition x(0).
Once one gets x(0), he can easily reconstruct {b(i)}MNi=0 to de-
crypt the cipher-image. x(0) can be determined by brute-force
a) Encrypted Lenna.bmp b) Encrypted Miss.bmp
Fig. 4. Lenna.bmp andMiss.bmp encrypted by BRIE, α = 1, β =
6, x(0) = 0.75 (compare them with Fig. 2)
searching. Of course, to break BRIE, we also should know α, β
besides x(0).
Now let us calculate the total number of available secret keys.
Assume the chaotic systems is iterated with floating-point arith-
metic of double precision, then x(0) will have 63 meaningful bits
(the sign bit must be zero since x(0) ≥ 0). Consider the number
of available α, β is 40, the total number of keys is 40× 263.
The exact computation complexity of the brute-force attack
is estimated as follows. For each key, b(MN + 1)/8c chaotic
iterations are needed to generate {b(i)}MNi=0 , and MN ROLR
operations are needed to decrypt the cipher-image. Assume one
chaotic iteration and one ROLR operation consume same time,
the average attack complexity of BRIE to brute-force attack will
be (40 × 263/2) × 9(MN + 1)/8 ≈ 267.5 × MN , which is
much smaller than 2MN when M,N are not too small. Assume
M = N = 512 = 29, which is the typical size of a “large” digital
image, the attack complexity will be only 267.5×MN = 285.5 
2MN = 2262144. Consider the rapid progress of digital comput-
ers and distributed arithmetic, the complexity is required to be not
lower than 2128 for a strict cipher [10]. Apparently, BRIE can
not provide enough security. As a result, the security of BRIE is
overestimated by the authors of [1], even under brute-force attack.
4. KNOWN/CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK
If one can get only one plain-image, he can break BRIE easily
and fast, which corresponds to the known/chosen-plaintext attack
in cryptanalysis. As we know, the known-plaintext and chosen-
plaintext attacks will be very meaningful if a same key is used
to encrypt more than one plaintexts, especially in the case that a
larger number of plaintexts are all encrypted with a same key. For
a “good” cipher, the capability to resist known-plaintext attack is
very important and generally needed. It is because of the follow-
ing fact: the key management will be very complex, inconvenient
and inefficient in many applications, if any key must not be used
to encrypt more than one plaintexts [10].
4.1. Breaking BRIE with Mask ArrayQ
Assume the known/chosen plain-image is f and its cipher-image
is f ′ (both M × N ). For the plain-pixel f(x, y), the cipher-
pixel f ′(x, y) must be one of the 8 values: ROLR10(f(x, y)) ∼
ROLR70(f(x, y)). By comparing f(x, y) and f ′(x, y), we can
easily find at least one integer 3 q(x, y), which satisfies f ′(x, y) =
3If f(x, y) belongs to class C4, only unique such integer exists. For
class C1, the number of such integers are 8; for C2, the number is 4; for
C3, the number is 2.
ROLR
q(x,y)
0 (f(x, y)). Repeat this procedure, we can get a mask
array Q = [q(x, y)]M×N . If f(x, y) is a gray value in class C4
(recall Sect. 3.1), q(x, y) can be used to decrypt any cipher-pixels
at (x, y). If f(x, y) is a gray value in class C1 ∼ C3, generally
q(x, y) cannot be used to decrypt cipher-pixels at (x, y). Fortu-
nately, for most digital images, the number of C1 ∼ C3 pixels is
much smaller than C4 pixels. Consequently, the mask arrayQ can
be employed to decrypt other cipher-images encrypted by BRIE
with same keys. If the size of the cipher-images is not larger than
the size of Q, the plain-images can be entirely recovered except
a few plain-pixels. Select Lenna.bmp as the known/chosen plain-
image, we obtain a mask array Q and then successfully cryptan-
alyze the cipher-image of Miss.bmp. The mask array Q and de-
crypted Miss.bmp are given in Fig. 5, where Q is transformed to
a pseudo-random image fQ as follows: FQ(x, y) = q(x, y)× 32.
We can see a few pixels in Miss.bmp cannot be correctly crypt-
analyzed because of the corresponding pixels in Lenna.bmp are
C1 ∼ C3 pixels.
a) Mask array Q b) Decrypted Miss.bmp by Q
Fig. 5. Cryptanalyze Miss.bmp using mask array Q generated
from known/chosen Lenna.bmp, α = 5, β = 1, x(0) = 0.75
Using Q as the cryptanalytic tool has two problems: a) For
a cipher-image whose size is larger than M × N , only M × N
pixels can be recovered. If the image is much larger thanM ×N ,
the recovered part cannot reflect the whole scene of the plain-
image. See Fig. 6 for the cryptanalytic result of a larger image
Peppers.bmp, whose size is 384 × 384 (larger than 256 × 256).
b) If the known/chosen image contains too less C4 pixels, there
will not be enough efficient q(x, y) to decrypt cipher-pixels. The
second problem can be overcome by increasing the number of
known/chosen plain-images.
4.2. Finding the Secret Keys fromQ
Obviously, the best solution to the problems of Q is to get the se-
cret keys of BRIE α, β and x(0). Once Q is obtained, we can
deduce α, β and equivalent x(0) by the following steps.
Step 1: Divide the known/chosen plain-image into 8-pixel blocks,
and find a C4 pixel f(x∗, y∗) followed by 2 consecutive C4 blocks4
(generally it is easy for most images).
Step 2: Assume α′ = 1 ∼ 7 and β′ = 1 ∼ 7.
Step 3: If α′ and/or β′ disobey the restrictions R1, R2 and R3
described in Sect. 3.2, go to Step 2;
Step 4: Calculate the following four values: q(1) = α′, q(2) =
(α′ + β′) mod 8, q(3) = 8− q(1), q(4) = (8− q(2)) mod 8.
Step 5: Get 16 bits {b(1), · · · , b(i), · · · , b(16)} from the mask
values q(x, y) corresponding to the 16 C4 plain-pixels starting
from f(x∗, y∗) as follows5:
4Here, “C4 block” means that all pixels in this block are C4 pixels.
5Note that {q(1), q(3)} ∩ {q(2), q(4)} = ∅ for any α, β.
a) Peppers.bmp (384× 384) b) Encrypted Peppers.bmp
c) Decrypted Peppers.bmp by Q
Fig. 6. Cryptanalyze Peppers.bmp using mask array Q generated
from known/chosen Lenna.bmp, α = 5, β = 1, x(0) = 0.75
• if q(x, y) 6∈ {q(1), q(2), q(3), q(4)}, go to Step 2;
• if q(x, y) ∈ {q(1), q(3)}, b(i) = 0;
• if q(x, y) ∈ {q(2), q(4)}, b(i) = 1.
Step 6: Generate two binary decimals using b(1) ∼ b(16): x1 =P8
i=1 b(i)× 2−i and x2 =
P8
i=1 b(i+ 8)× 2−i.
Step 7: If x2 and x1 yield the equation of the employed chaotic
system, mark the current α′ and β′ as a candidate for the right α
and β. Go to Step 2 until α′ = 7 and β′ = 7.
Step 8: Search the right α and β in all marked candidates.
Step 9: Brute-forcedly search the other n− 8 bits of x1, where n
is the meaningful bit number of the chaotic orbit.
In the above procedure, if the 16 continuous C4 pixels are
the first 16 pixels of plain-images, then x1 = x(0); otherwise
x1 is a equivalent key of x(0) since x1 also can be used to gen-
erate chaotic sequence after x1. The search complexity of the
above procedure is chiefly determined by Step 9. When n = 63
(double precision floating-point arithmetic), it is 255, which is still
rather large. But compared with the complexity of simple brute-
force attack (see Sect. 3.3), the key entropy decreases by at least
log2(40× 28) ≈ 13.3 bits.
5. IMPROVING BRIE
To improve the security of BRIE to brute-force attack and the at-
tack of getting the secret keys fromQ, some simple modifications
will be efficient, such as increasing the bit number of x(0), adding
control parameters of the chaotic system to the secret keys. But
neither of them can improve the security to the known/chosen-
plaintext attack with Q.
To escape from the known/chosen-plaintext attack based on
Q, some complicated modifications should be made, such as cas-
cading an extra cipher to perturb the cipher-image after BRIE [10],
or using pseudo-randomly generated α and β by cipher-pixels or
added secret keys [11,12]. Here, the security of the modified BRIE
will be ensured by the new parts, not the BRIE itself.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we point out the insecurity of a novel image en-
cryption method proposed in [1]. Detailed cryptanalytic investi-
gations are given and a known/chosen-plaintext attack is presented
to break this image encryption method. We suggest not using it in
strict applications, except it can be ensured that any secret key will
never been used repeatedly to encrypt more than one plain-images.
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